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Disaggregation and marketisation of government owned electricity utilities can 
deliver private sector confidence, investment, increased competition and reduce the 
reliance on distortionary taxpayer-funded subsidies. However, the transition from 
command and control to designed competitive electricity markets may be at odds with 
the physical realities of specific network infrastructure, network operator technical 
requirements, and a dominance of large generators or etailers. This work explores 
these transitional nuances in the context of the disaggregation of Western Australia’s 
(WA’s) electricity sector towards a Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM), including 
bilateral contracts, the WEMs Short Term Electricity Market (STEM), and the 
Balancing Market (BM) operating within the largest WA network, the South West 
Interconnected System (SWIS). While market-based instruments offer a range of 
flexible designs to policymakers, this work primarily focuses on the how these market 
mechanisms are progressing from the perspective of nsuring supply reliability, 
participant certainty, and good governance in the continued expansion of the 






Electricity markets are essentially “designer” markets that attempt to employ a 
manageable commercial model to the non-commodity physical realities of electricity 
systems 1. The more complicated the market design, the more likely that gaming will 
occur when participants manipulate markets to gain at the expense of consumers. This 
was essentially what led the State of California to sue Enron Corp 2. Attempting to 
match a manageable commercial model to electricity systems can lead to market 
designs that favour established interests with older technologies and traditional 
supply-side options at the expense of new technologies, approaches, and entrants 1. 
The recent wave of electricity liberalisation has relied on the view that the generation 
component of electricity markets are a potentially competitive industry whose prices 
should be set on an unregulated wholesale market 3. External benefits that can 
accompany new generation investments are larger supply availability, lower emission 
intensities, greater frequency and voltage control, improved reliability, higher water-
use efficiencies, parallel synergistic network investments, improved strategic security, 
etc. Thus, deregulation should not be based on an ideological belief in competition, 
but a careful cost-benefit analysis 2. As market-based instruments offer flexibility and 
numerous market design choices, it can be difficult to project how complex designer 
markets will behave with significant influence from existing institutional, moral, and 
theoretical ideologies 1. For example, a few dominant electricity sellers can abuse 
their market power and raise prices, while too many sellers can result in fierce price 
competition and render the industry financially unstable 2, and reduce real 
competition. However, if the new market is successful, disaggregation, marketisation, 
and privatisation of government owned assets in the electricity sector can deliver 
confidence to private sector concerns about competitive neutrality, energy market 
entry barriers, and uncertainty over government budget investment reduction 4.  
 
The enormity of the restructuring task from state-run electricity monopolies towards 
commercial models and competitive markets requires transparent methods of 
comparing alternative options, incorporating scenarios of uncertainty of policy 
changes, technological developments, and consumer preferences 5. The theory of 
modern electricity industry restructuring is to displace taxpayer funding with private 
investment and competition to create downward pressu  on electricity prices 6. A 
regulated integrated utility is often accused of over-investment in the electricity 
sector, which, under regulation, leads to an insufficient return on the investment 
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(ROI) 2. However, when vertically integrated and regulated monopoly structures are 
well governed, electricity prices are set to cover total costs which enables the utility to 
finance investments over time 3, and achieve a reasonable ROI. The key issue is 
whether a liberalised electricity industry can deliv r sustainably competitive outcomes  
in terms of timely investment, built at least cost and deliver competitive electricity 
prices in a more efficient manner than vertically integrated models 3. This work 
incorporates examples of regulatory and market developments related to the 
Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM), but also the electricity supply chain in WA 
with fundamentally different temporal investment timelines, information 
asymmetries, and governance arrangements. 
 
 
1. WEM BACKGROUND 
In October 2001, the WA Government established the Electricity Reform Task Force 
to investigate options for a more competitive electricity market, which presented its 
final report in October 2002. The WA Office of Energy was given the task of 
implementing the establishment of a wholesale electricity trading market within the 
SWIS 7. (See Figure 1).  On the 21 September 2006 the WA EM commenced 
trading. The WEM is a net pool electricity market where suppliers are paid for 
electricity produced, with an additional reserve/demand management capacity market 
8. The WEM establishment required the disaggregation of the vertically integrated 
utility, Western Powera, into four state-owned trading corporations 7,9. These four 
entities are: 
• Verve Energy, responsible for state-owned generation on the SWIS; 
• Synergy Energy, responsible for retail operations and providing interruptible 
and curtailable demand side management services on the SWISb; 
• Western Powerc, now responsible for distribution and transmission networks, 
and as a result is also the SWIS system operator, and; 
                                                
a On 1 January 1995, Western Power was established under the Electricity Corporation Act 1994, when 
the former State Energy Commission of Western Australia (SECWA) was divided into two vertically 
integrated government-owned gas and electricity utilities, Alinta Gas and Western Power, respectively. 
SECWA was previously named the State Energy Commission (SEC). 
b Synergy Energy has in practice no capability of providing interruptible load, the extent of their 
curtailable load capabilities is likewise questionable, although the Market Rules seems to enable such a 
possibility. 
c The vertically integrated electricity utility’s final name (Western Power) was retained for the network 
utility.   
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• Horizon Power, a vertically integrated utility responsible for all state-owned 
electricity operations outside of the SWIS 7. 
 
 






The formal objectives of the WEM are to: 
• Promote the economically efficient, safe and reliable production and supply of 
electricity and related services in the SWIS; 
• Encourage competition between generators and retailers in the SWIS, 
including by entry of new competitors; 
• Avoid discrimination in that market against particular energy options and 
technologies, including sustainable energy options and technologies such as 
those that make use of renewable resources or that educe overall greenhouse 
gas emissions; 
• Minimise the long-term cost of electricity supplied to customers from the 
SWIS, and;  
• Encourage the taking of measures to manage the amount of electricity used 
and when it is used 8.  
 
The Independent Market Operator (IMO) was established in December 2004 as an 
independent entity with no commercial interest in the WEM to ensure transparency, 
fairness and confidentiality in the implementation f their responsibilities 10. The 
Minister for Energy appoints the board of the IMO 6. The IMO has 15d stated 
functions (2.1.2.a – 2.1.2.o) in the Market Rules, including; administering the rules 
and the tender process for network control services and enter into network control 
service contracts; operating the Reserve Capacity Mechanism (RCM), the Short Term 
Energy Market (STEM) and the Balancing Market (BM); settling market transactions; 
to carry out a long term projected assessment of system adequacy study, and publish 
the Statement of Opportunities Report (SOO); to develop and amend the Market 
Rules and market procedures information and make copies available; support the 
Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) in its market surveillance and market 
effectiveness roles; and to monitor, investigate and e force actions on other rule 
participants for compliance and breaches under the egulations and the Market Rules 
7,10,11.  
 
The ERA has a key role in market surveillance, monitoring and reporting the WA 
Government on the efficiency and effectiveness of the WEM 7. The ERA also has 
licensing and network access responsibilities as well as several approval functions 
                                                
d The remaining other IMO stated functions are of little interest to this chapter. 
6 
 
such as setting maximum prices for the RCM, the maxi um and minimum electricity 
prices, and the costs for the operation of both the IMO and System Management 7. 
System Management is responsible for maintaining security, safety and reliability of 
the physical power system in addition to conducting short and medium system 
planning 11. It is a “ring-fenced” business unit of Western Power that reports to the 
Western Power Board 7,11.  
 
In theory, if a regulator has perfect information othe marginal cost functions of 
individual firms command and control instruments lead to an efficient policy 12. 
However, in reality when markets and regulatory frameworks are developed, 
governing and regulatory entities should expect that participants will look thoroughly 
into market designs to minimise costs and for weaknsses to exploit 1.
 
 
2. MARKET TRADING AND EVOLUTION 
An estimated 48% of WA electricity consumption (15,113 GWh) was traded through 
the WEM in 2008/09 13. The WEM is comprised of three separate electricity markets 
with three separate timeframes: bilateral trades occur between eight and one day prior 
to trading; STEM trades occur for each half hour of the day on the day before each 
trading day, and; BM trades occur when the energy consumed and supplied are 
unexpectedly imbalancede 8. The IMO receives generation output, conducts BM and
STEM trade settlement, and receives only some bilateral contract information 7,8. 
Interestingly, the most common electricity trading mechanism is bilateral contracts 
between generators and retailer/customers, although the IMO has no role in the 
structure, duration or pricing of bilateral contracs 7, in addition to not receiving 
bilateral trade price information 8. As the IMO has no commercial interest in the 
WEM, the provision of such information will likely improve the ability of the IMO to 




                                                
e This is often due to the difference between the IMO’s expected daily demand forecast and any change 
(usually temperature) that increases or decreases electricity demand. This is also a function of how 
much intermittent generation is available, as this is traded through the BM. 
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Market customers are entities that purchase electricity from the WEM, and are able to 
either consume their purchased electricity, or sell it as a retailer 7. Electricity 
customers are either non-contestable or contestable customers, meaning that they are 
small consumers and purchase electricity from Synergy Energy, or are large 
customers that can buy electricity from sources other than Synergy Energy, 
respectively 6. As WEM electricity generation and retail are each contestable services, 
the WEM design attempts to facilitate competitive trading between retailers and 
generators 6. While there is increasingly more generation competition, Synergy 
Energy is the dominant retailer, although this too is being challenges somewhat in 
recent months. However, the situation in the WA WEM closely resembles what is 
known as a “monopsony” - a market situation where th re is a single buyer for a 
productf 15.  
 
In the first six months of the STEM operation, there was a steady decline in electricity 
prices, especially in peak prices, possibly due to the removal of fuel restrictions, 
increased generator availability and changing trading strategies. However, there was 
only between four and seven active participants 8, fluctuating mostly between four 
and six, with the yearly lowest number of traders being two and the highest being nine 
14. The STEM allows small variable generators to manage temporary supply shortages 
or large increases in generation by purchasing or selling the difference between 
electricity output and customer demand 16. A larger number of STEM trades occurred 
between generators, suggesting accessing of lower cost plants 8.Over the first two 
years, STEM trading was very illiquid and prices were low. However, due to new 








                                                
f The IMO uses the market change in Individual Reserve Capacity Requirement (IRCR) as a proxy 
measure of customer churn as the movement of contestabl  retail customers is an indicator of market 
competition 14 Independent Market Operator Western Australia. 2007. Wholesale Electricity Market 
- Electricity Trading 2006/07. Perth.. 
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Figure 2a: STEM prices (AUD MWh-1) between 8pm on the 21/9/2006, and 11.30 pm 





Figure 2b: STEM prices (AUD MWh-1) between 12.00 am on the 19/7/2008, and 7.30 





The BM allows variable generators to sell their entir  output to avoid becoming a 
retailer and any requirement to match customer demand to electricity generated 16. 
Over the first six months BM prices were higher than STEM prices, which reflects 
market participants tendency to buy electricity in real time rather than the day aheadg 
8. Prices of electricity in the STEM and BM trended downwards in the early months 
becoming relatively steady, apart from the fuel supply limitations 14. On more recent 
years the prices have trended upwards, with noticeable variations in trading behaviour 
changes. The average monthly trading prices for the BM are generally between 5% 
and 25% greater that the STEM and the total percentag  of electricity traded through 
both the STEM and BM remain very low – around only 5% of the total trades 14. This 
remains the case several years later with bilateral rades still comprising around 95% 
of total trading. Comparing STEM to BM trading, the BM is much healthier in terms 
of use than the STEM, as it generally comprises the vast majority of the 5% of trades.  
 
Unlike many commodity markets, electricity often cannot be stored in substantial 
quantities, so competitive spot markets are likely to be very volatile in small intervals 
of time 3. This is not the case in the WEM’s STEM as the lowelectricity prices limit 
price volatility (a maximum AUD276h MWh-1 for non-liquid capacity), and System 
Management can dispatch request a generator when deman  increases. Electricity 
system and network planning information is an effectiv  option that can provide 
benefits to decrease the ability of a small number of arbitrage traders, and level the 
playing field to various competing technologies in a competitive market 4. Knowledge 
of capital restrictions, information disparities, and other barriers to electricity trading 
can assist a positive culture of arbitrage trading to increase market effectiveness 17. 
 
Systematic differences from bilateral trading and spot prices can indicate trader risk 
aversion or an impediment that prevents full integration of the markets 17. In 2007, the 
IMO stated that as vesting contract cover between th  two major WEM participants 
(Verve Energy and Synergy Energy) reduces and further generation and retail 
competition emerges, the STEM will become a stronger alternative to bilateral 
                                                
g BM prices are administered post-ante prices, and are determined by the IMO against submitted 
marginal cost curves. BM prices may also have been higher because the IMO significantly under-
predict demand vs. supply, the market anticipated inaccurate predictions, or intermittent resources did 
not dampen BM supply as anticipated. 
h For the year 1/10/2009 to 1/10/2010 and is adjusted annually with the Consumer Price Index. The 
liquid-fuelled facility maximum price over the same p riod is currently around AUD450 MWh-1 and is 
adjusted monthly based on the Singapore crude oil price. Therefore, the liquid-fuelled maximum 
STEM price varies considerably. 
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contracts 14. In practice, this may not be the case as with long asset lives, and low 
retail tariffs, as generation investors will seek stable revenues to minimise their capital 
expenditures, even if an opportunity to access higher volatile prices exists. The 
experience of Californian competitive electricity markets shows that bilateral 
contracts reduce in volume with the opportunity for arbitrage 17. However, arbitrage 
encourages firms to operate at the short-term margin l cost of operation, which is zero 
for renewable energy. Possible solutions to the over-pr ference for bilateral trading in 
the WEM may be a simple regulation of the relative proportions of bilateral trades 
versus STEM and BM trades. This may improve the information provision to the 
IMO, which is currently “blind” to the information contained in 95% of trades. 
 
Similar to most commodity markets, risk-averse generators engage in long-term 
bilateral contracts to ensure a relatively stable price 18. This provides opportunities for 
investment in new coal-fired capacity can sign a long-term contract to sell both 
electricity and RCM capacity credits with a retailer to fund the plant 6. Thus, retailers 
are also able to insulate themselves from any price change in the WEM and the RCM 
with a bilateral contract 6. Relatively low electricity price volatility in the WEM is 
moderated by paying generators and demand side management providers RCM 
payments sufficient to fund the total investment in new capacity, such as a peak 
demand gas turbine, without the investment receiving payment from electricity sales 
7. There is slightly over two years between the RCM reserve capacity cycle to choose 
successful generation capacity and a new generation facility requirement to be 
physically capable of meeting RCM obligations. As this is a relatively short lead time 
in terms of new transmission infrastructure provision, environmanetal approvals, 
equipment procurement (etc.), there is a temporal difference between RCM 
obligations and the reality of required investment timelines to effectively cater for 
growth of the electricity system 19. As new generators must have Western Power 
connection approval to apply for RCM certification, this may be a considerable 
barrier that disadvantages new entrants, and may also lead to unnecessarily inflated 








3. THE NETWORK, DEMAND GROWTH, AND THE SUPPLY CHAIN  
In WA, the increased electricity demand, especially from the minerals sector within 
the SWIS, has lead to a number of proposals for newmines that require timely 
construction of transmission lines and other support infrastructure 19. For example, the 
Boddington Gold Mine on the south of the SWIS accounted for an almost doubling of 
the total load growth in one year - an additional 3% to the expected 3.3% normal 
increase 19. The uncertainty and asymmetries of investment timelines between the 
establishment of large resource industry loads, theinfrastructure investment 
requirements, and the generation investment are currently preventing new 
developments in some areas 20. WEM participants, whether they are customers or 
generators, are required to provide transmission upgrades in most cases. In WA 
mining companies often pay for a transmission upgrades or establishment and 
generation capacity then “piggyback” such investments. The delays to the WA State 
Government construction of the Geraldton 330 kV transmission line is a recent 
example of transmission investments preventing the installation of both new 
generation capacity, particularly renewable capacity, and the establishment of new 
mining operations in the MidWest Region in the northe n extension of the SWIS 19. 
Similarly, the volatility on mineral resource prices can create additional uncertainty, 
as mines move in and out of full operation to care nd maintenance. As the WA 
economy is heavily dependent on the mining industry, especially in regional and 
remote areas, the availability of energy infrastructure and supporting technology 
investments that cater for demand volatility that blance with pricing structures that 
enables a reasonable ROI is growing in importance.  
 
The National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) are commissioned 
to produce two SWIS electricity forecasts: total annual electricity demand (GWh), 
and;  the maximum capacity (MW) required to supply demand in any one half-hour in 
a year, all for high, expected, and low economic growth scenarios 7. The NIEIR’s 
SWIS forecasts are used by the IMO, alongside historic demand data, air-conditioning 
demand, and major industrial load projections to determine a final electricity forecast 
of maximum demand and total financial year consumption 19. The difference between 
the NIEIR 2008 SOO and the 2009 SOO forecasts WA economic forecasts were 
substantial after the financial crisis 20, demonstrating the capriciousness of planning 
using econometric forecast modelling alone. Thus, the IMO’s 2009 Statement of 
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Opportunities (SOO) report expected demand forecastsi for 2010/11 on the SWIS 
were 307 MW less than the 2008 SOO forecast due to delays in major resource 
projects from the economic downturn and the northern transmission line 20. Whist the 
WA economy was exceptionally robust, the actual electricity consumed in WA in 
2008/09 was 2% below the previous low economic forecast case, and 3.2% below the 
expected forecast 20, demonstrating the forecasting sensitivity to economic activity 
and questionable utility from year to year. 
 
Nonetheless longer term forecasts are necessary, and the 2009 SOO economic annual 
growth forecasts were close to 2% for Australia, and 3% for WA over the period to 
2019/20 20. Over the period to 2019/20, the annual SWIS electricity consumption is 
expected to grow by 3.3% on average, with high-growth and low-growth scenarios of 
4.3% and 2.8%, respectively 20. With such growth, a dysfunctional input market can 
compromise the economic performance of a wholesale electricity market 2. The SWIS 
has a significant percentage of generation supplied by a long single gas pipeline and is 
therefore vulnerable to fuel supply constraints 21. The gas used in the SWIS is mainly 
transported by the Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline and the Goldfields Gas 
Pipeline, with some additional gas sourced from the Parmelia Pipeline 9. The Dampier 
to Bunbury Pipeline limited the SWIS gas-fired generation capacity until the Stage 5B 
expansion, but further gas supply and price increases may constrain the continued 
expansion of gas capacity 19. Interestingly, the focus of global gas-fired electricity 
supply capacity is following a trend of vertical re-integration by commercial 
acquisitions of upstream natural gas assets as a strategy to reduce energy supply risk 3.  
 
 
4. MAINTAINING SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
The Varanus Island gas explosion on June 3 2008 lead the IMO to require RCM 
participants to provide full details of their fuel supply and transport contract 
arrangements, entailing additional administrative burden in some cases 19. Electricity 
systems are at most risk in times of highest load when a generator failure may 
decrease reliability of load provision 22. System reliability was maintained by the duel 
fuel and liquids-only capacity during the Varanus Island interruption. However, the 
                                                
i (10% POE) 
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SWIS duel fuel capacity is decreasing 20, while gas-only capacity has expanded to 
around 40% by the 2010/11 23.  
 
Both electricity supply reliability and quality is growing in importance, especially for 
timescales of seconds to even cycles 24. Power quality involves current and voltage 
waveform disturbances, and the presence of momentary steady-state voltage 
variations and harmonic variations and distortion 25. Both utilities and facilities are 
increasingly concerned with these issues as modern equipment is often sensitive to 
disturbances, arising both from within facilities and from the network 25. In the 
majority of electricity systems, more than 80% of all f ults occur in distributions 
systems with 80% of these faults being grounding faults, of which 90% of these 
grounding faults are instantaneous faults 26. The SWIS has significantly lower 
generation unit outage rates than other systems and well-established benchmarks 21.
Nonetheless, the regional power quality in particular areas of the SWIS distribution 
system is well known to require additional investment to overcome quality issues, in 
addition to reliably suppling the increasing demands in many remote areas. 
Implementing information policy instruments can assist in generating a greater 
awareness of a number of small (but often significant in aggregate for small regional 
areas) quality and reliability issues before they bcome a recurring issue that hinder 
new economic investment or require people to resort to on-site back-up generation for 
known intervals of regional demand exceeding supply.   
 
Complex correlations between reliability and price in restructured markets arise in the 
main because of random system failure uncertainties and variable demand responses 
in different nodal regions 18. Recent recommended changes to the SWIS Reliability 
Criteria included the current reserve capacity margin should be related to maximum 
demand forecasts rather than the largest generating unit 27. This will require greater 
investment in areas such as meteorological forecasting, as the single most important 
determinant of SWIS electricity demand is the daily temperature 7,28. Summer 
maximum temperatures can range from the mid-twenties to the mid-forties, resulting 
in daily peak demand fluctuations from below 2,000 MW and above 4,000 MW 20. At 
present Verve Energy is required to balance the real-time difference between 





4.1 FLEXIBLE ALTERNATING CURRENT TRANSMISSION SYSTE M 
(FACTS) AND FREQUENCY CONTROL ANCILLARY SERVICES (F CAS) 
OPTIONS 
Reliability of electricity supply and available transmission capacity are 
interchangeable and both can be enhanced with new ivestment 24. Transmission 
constraints across trading regions that were designd under integrated utilities are 
often unsuitable to accommodate wholesale electricity trading 2. Flexible AC 
Transmission System (FACTS) technologies are alterna ing current transmission 
systems incorporating power electronics and other static controllers to enhance 
controllability and increase power transfer capacity 24,29. FACTS provide dynamic 
control of the power transfer parameters transmission voltage, line impedance and 
phase angle to utilise transmission lines to nearer th i  thermal limits,  active power 
flow and reactive power, and will also be able to st re and supply reactive power 
when electricity storage technologies become more available 24. Lack of adequate 
transmission infrastructure under open access arrangements limits trading to higher 
cost areas, creates load pockets and exacerbates market power 2. The function of 
optimal power flow is to minimise the total generation cost while satisfying power 
balance equations and constraints such as bus voltage and reactive power 24. By 
including FACTS devices in achieving optimal power flow, a network operator can 
reduce total real power loss and reactive power loss 24,29,30. The use of FACTS devices 
can assist in reducing the generation cost and electricity spot prices in deregulated 
electricity markets 30 as cited in 24. However, such technologies come at a cost to the 
network operator, and various FACTS devices and options require sufficiently 
transparent market recognition, especially for higher penetrations of variable 
generation technologies. 
 
The impacts on FCAS from variable generation penetration of 10% or less is not 
significant once existing requirements from conventional generators and electricity 
demand are taken into account with cost-reflective charging exists 31. International 
experience has also shown that variable generation penetration approaches 20%, 
additional FCAS are required, and when penetration reaches 30% total cost incurrent 
by market participants is around 2% of the retail price of electricity as conventional 
generators run at less than full output or are standing idle 31. These costs would likely 
be a function of the proportion of baseload electricity and market design. The actual 
cost of further introduction of variable capacity in the WEM may be higher than 
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international experience as baseload generators would have to be compensated for 
coming off line. Minimum frequency keeping capacity s determined by Western 
Power. This was increased from 30 MW up to 50 MW for the year 2009/10 stated that 
this is to cater for wind farm output 19, and has now been raised to 60 MW 20 for 
subsequent years. This attribution to cater for variable output generation in the SWIS 
is likely an overestimate of requirements, and would also be reflective of the lack of 
transmission in the areas where wind capacity on the network are connected – mainly 
in the northern areas of the SWIS.  Actively providing a requirement for using 
additional frequency keeping capacity (or even demand side management options) for 
the purpose of providing real-time FCAS distorts the economics for non-generation 
technologies with a specific primary purpose of providing FCAS to a network 24. The 
current System Management contracts with generation capacity for ancillary services 
may be more efficiently replaced with an auction to provide these contingency, 
regulation and load following services required to operate the SWIS 32. 
 
As a general rule, the more information one has about p tential output changes and 
the earlier one has it, the lower the cost of providing for any FCAS 31. Incentives for 
new variable generation technologies that more effectiv ly contribute to system 
inertia can be incorporated by trading inertia and FCAS the same market by either 
trading them on a relative basis or by giving concessions to providers of effective 
levels of inertia when allocating the cost of FCAS 31. Regardless of whether WEM 
changes to encourage the FCAS and FACTS examples in this work are the best 
options to pursue, improved network planning and control information enables a more 




5. GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
Concern over the weakness of the WEMs capacity deficiency signal arise from 
relatively low price signals and penalties for capacity availability at critical times, the 
administratively set reserve capacity margin, and the dominance of Verve Energy and 
Synergy Energy in the generation and retail markets, r pectively 4. As the WEM 
trading dominance between Verve Energy and Synergy Energy is likely to continue, 
the market’s effectiveness will be heavily dependent on their behaviour 8. To attempt 
to reduce Verve Energy’s dominance, the utility operat s under a WA State 
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Government directive to operate at 3000 MW of total capacity 23. The market share of 
the incumbent generator Verve Energy will have reduc  from 90% at WEM 
commencement in 2006, to around 66% in 2010/11 23. However, as Verve Energy are 
currently prevented from selling their generation capacity the utility is unable to 
reduce their current capacity to obtain new more effici nt generation technology 4. In 
addition to this artificial barrier, Verve Energy operates with a significant debtj 33, of 
which will ultimately be paid by the taxpayer.  Verv  Energy’s debt and Western 
Power’s recent taxpayer funded network upgrades is not the only re-routing of funds 
within the SWIS government-owned utilities. Currently he WA Uniform Tariff 
Policy (UTP) requires the government owned electricity utility, Synergy Energy, to 
provide electricity services at a price that is uniform throughout the state 34. The UTP 
ensures Horizon Power (non-SWIS) customers are charged the same tariff rates as 
those on the SWIS, and therefore electricity prices will not reflect the true cost of 
generation, transmission and distribution in many regional areas, resulting in a 
distorted electricity market 34,35. 
 
In 2009, the UTP subsidy resulted in a AUD72 million transfer from residential and 
small businesses via the Tariff Equalisation Fund (TEF) to cross-subsidise Horizon 
Power’s residential, small business and large busines  customersk 35. The TEF was 
established to enable Horizon Power to maintain tariff p otection outside the SWIS 
and is funded from the network access charges for the SWIS 10. The TEF essentially 
gives Horizon Power an equivalent cost of production in regional areas as the SWIS 
35. Therefore, even cost-reflective tariffs on the SWI  will still not fully cover higher 
costs of service provision in non-SWIS regions of WA 35. The TEF therefore can act 
as a barrier to private investment in competitive market mechanisms on the SWIS.  
 
There are less distortionary mechanisms to achieve a similar level of equity 
throughout regions in terms of electricity prices than the TEF 34. One such option is 
the replacement of the TEF with a Community Service Obligation Payment. This 
would also be consistent with other essential servic s in WA, although would be a 
subsidy from the state budget rather than electricity onsumers 35. Other available 
mechanisms fully funded direct payments by the WA State Government, either from 
                                                
j  In the first quarter of 2007 Verve Energy debt was AUD836 million, with continued net losses of 
significantly over AUD100 million for the financial years ending 2008 and 2009. 
k Large business customer tariff network component structures do not contribute to the TEF. 
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consolidated revenue, dividends returned from governm nt owned electricity 
companies, or from Commonwealth Government competition payments to State 
Governments for implementing the competition reform in the electricity industry 34. It 
is more appropriate to subsidise disadvantaged customers directly from outside of 
tariff structures than cross-subsidies between different tariffs 35. While electricity 
affordability is important, tariff structures must also provide an appropriate ROI to 
attract new generation, retail and network capacity 35, in addition to more efficiently 
allocating resources by encouraging electricity conservation when cost are very high. 
 
Network connection risks associated with transmission infrastructure delays 
compound increased WEM cost risks, especially when new large consumers become 
connected 20. New network augmentations will ideally be passed onto retailers via 
network tariff components, an increasingly large portion of total electricity supply 
costs, which is also subject to significant levels of uncertainty depending on economic 
development 35. This network augmentation cost to be recovered from electricity 
customers is estimated to be around AUD30 million fr 2011/12 20. However, while 
WA electricity supply costs have increased significantly since 1997/98, residential 
electricity prices remained fixed until mid 2009, which corresponded to a real price 
reduction of around 30% over the period, with a similar price reduction in small and 
large businesses tariffs occurring over almost two decades 35. Australian states other 
than WA have experienced similar supply cost increases, although the majority of 
other state’s electricity tariff structures have reflected this growth 35. While 
components of the electricity prices have reduced in the east coast of Australia from 
electricity deregulation 2, it is not clear if the same integrated utility inefficiencies 
were overly prevalent in WA prior to disaggregation. 
 
In addition to recent increases, the WA Government’s Office of Energy forecast a 
cost-reflective residential tariff (A1/A2) will require an increase of 20% for the 
network component, and an additional 31% for the retail component in the 2009/10 
period 35. In the years 2010/11 and 2011/12, additional network component increases 
are forecast to require 11% increases in each year to chieve cost-reflectivity 35. The 
Office of Energy also forecast slightly smaller but comparable annual total percentage 
tariff increases for small and large businesses to attain cost-reflectivity 35. Using cost-
reflective mechanisms can be particularly effective at reducing the network cost 
burden of high air conditioning loads on hot days b compensating either demand side 
18 
 
response activities or additional generation capacity that provide these services to the 
network on top of reducing or servicing loads 31.  
 
 
7. GOVERNANCE DELIVERING SUBOPTIMAL COST-REFLECTIVI TY: 
AN EXAMPLE 
Competitive electricity markets require cost-reflective tariffs to attract and retain new 
private entrants and prevent government-owned utility taxpayer cross-subsidies 35. 
Cost-reflective mechanisms for supporting new network connections provide an 
incentive to locate variable systems where they are of greatest benefit by offsetting 
conventional generation capacity and deferring additional distribution and 
transmission capacity expenditure 31. WA electricity tariffs have not been cost-
reflective for some time and retail prices need to reflect supply costs to maintain 
financial viability of both public and private generation participants 35. The WA State 
Government recently announced retail tariff price increases that are aimed towards 
cost-reflectivity. However, there is one example where the Government-owned 
natural monopoly (Western Power) are exploiting the currently lax definition, 
quantification, and justification for applying “cost-reflectivity” principals to seek 
larger returns on the network component of the retail lectricity tariffs. This example 
describes how the new tariff structure changes are in stark contrast to the third formal 
objective of the WEM: Avoid discrimination in that market against particular energy 
options and technologies, including sustainable energy options and technologies such 
as those that make use of renewable resources or that educe overall greenhouse gas 
emissions.   
 
In 2010, the ERA has accepted Western Power’s proposed revisions to the SWIS 
access arrangements to introduce a new tariff (RT12), specifically to give the 
residential customer “a blunt signal that if they connect an embedded generator, then 
the customer will pay the same amount to Western Power regardless of any decision 
they might make to shift or reduce their peak demand or their times of consumption” 
36 pg 34. This new tariff simply increases the price of electricity by around 6%l to an 
average small residential distributed generator (usually around 1-3 kWp of 
                                                
l Based on the RT12 hourly and fixed network component costings and the author’s estimates of a 




photovoltaics), disregarding the cost of the customer’s investment. According to 
Western Power the new tariff is simply “a usage based charge, to customers... [which 
is] the difference between the new tariff and [the existing tariff structure]”, and that 
“...the new tariff would be at a higher rate to compensate for the reduced network 
electricity consumption” Pg 4 36. In addition to higher network component prices, the
total off-peak hours in determined in the new tariff is around 65% of the existing 
tariff, meaning the increases prices are imposed for longer for importing electricity 
relative to customers with a bi-directional tariff.  
 
Western Power sought to increase the marginal price to bi-directional customers in 
their initial submission to the ERA, without a sufficiently specific research 
methodology for calculating the magnitude of additional costs in WA. Instead, 
Western Power used a sub-optimal estimate of network component costs derived from 
third party research on a fundamentally different electricity market operating on a 
another network. This was deemed sufficient evidence to the ERA. With the strategic 
direction of the WA State Government attempting to increase the component of 
renewable energy on the SWIS, foster distributed generation (especially on the fringes 
of the SWIS), diversify supply, and improve transparency through the WEM and the 
IMO, in time the decision by the ERA may be perceived as a contrary and 
discriminating one relative to the Government and WEM objectives, respectively. 
 
To avoid continued political and market problems, an independent regulatory body 
such as the ERA could regularly review electricity tariffs on economic criteria to 
ensure maintenance of cost-reflective tariffs 35. Cost-reflective mechanisms are 
necessary in the SWIS as there are strong technical constraints to variable generators 
in the fringe-of-grid 31. In fringe-of-grid areas of the SWIS low levels of inertia 
restrict the ability to connect new generators and there is scope to review the 
definition of spinning reserves and load rejection services to include the provision of 
this additional inertia 31. Generation technologies with high system inertia or a high 
capacity to resist disturbances in system frequency, such as conventional synchronous 
generators, variable-speed synchronous wind turbines, doubly-fed induction wind 
turbines and photovoltaic systems, could be used to control system inertia in regional 
areas 31. In the above example, these are precisely the technologies which are 
discriminated against with the new RT12 tariff. Even according to Western Power, the 




While time-of-use tariffs provide strong price incetives for energy conservation in 
peak demand times, they only become possible by the installation of a smart meter 35. 
From the network operator’s perspective, the higher network costs from additional 
metering of implementing time-of-use tariffs would meaningless, especially when the 
UTP exists. If time-of use tariffs do not provide sufficient opportunities for reducing 
the cost of electricity provision for consumers, then there will be little enthusiasm to 
implement time-of-use tariffs 37, and creative mechanisms may be required. 
 
Time-of-use tariffs can enable optimised load shifting and cost reductions 37, 
specifically designed to cater for SWIS network geographical limitations. Whilst the 
commercial benefits of smart meters do not generally exceed the cost to electricity 
retailers and network utilities, the societal and economy-wide benefits of this 
technology requires a regulatory approach to capture hese external benefits 38. As 
WA exhibits a load profile that has an extremely high peak demand when compared 
to average electricity consumption, the aggregate benefits to the IMO, Western 
Power, generators, and retailers may make commercial sense, depending on the 
timescale of such investment and the chosen discount rate. Societal or economy-wide 
benefits include: increased energy supply security; lower costs for lower peak 
generation capacity; avoided expenditures in distribu ion and transmission network 
upgrades; environmental benefits from reduced energy demand; new energy service 
provision to consumers; enabled consumers that can switch suppliers, and; an 
increased balance between energy supply and demand th t leads to a more efficient 
wholesale electricity market 38. Maximising social interests entail an optimal balance 
between load shifting and minimising the cost of electricity provision 37. However, 
whilst the business case for smart metering is poor f r some entities, it can facilitate 
revenue-enhancement activities by developing new services 38, or conversely prevent 




It can be very difficult to predict how complex markets will behave in practice 1.
Nonetheless, governance and regulatory mechanisms should aim to foster innovation 
over a number of regulatory periods that are inclusive of the evolving nature and 
variety of current and future stakeholders: networks, etailers, generators, technology 
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developers, and new markets entrants 39. It is to be expected that broad reaching 
measures will overlap with other policy measures, leaving utility and industry 
behaviours and policy responses difficult to anticipate and credibly verify 
performance 1.  
 
Differential temporal investment timelines, information asymmetries, and current 
governance arrangements all prevent efficient pricing structures and technology 
diversification reflective of actual costs and the technical reality of developing a 
secure and reliable electricity market in WA. A culture of information asymmetry is 
evident by the market operator not having access to undisclosed bilateral trade prices. 
The lack of transparency is another risk to those primarily using the STEM or BM, 
who already have less certainty in price and ROIs. A combination of information 
asymmetries and the multiple responsibilities of network operators, such as the IMO 
may lead to future functional conflicts of interest and a disaggregation of some of 
these responsibilities to a relevant national body might provide cost savings, market 
harmonisation, and increased administration efficien y 4. 
 
The current concentration of influence from governance on regulatory structures, and 
the significance of large market players should be of concern in WA. In markets as 
small as the WEM where the ERA controls licensing, etwork access, and the 
operating costs of System Management, who is also a part of the network utility 
Western Power, alongside one dominant utility controlling retail contestability and 
prices, are cases in point. It seems the fundamental issue and resultant risk to the 
electricity system in WA is the inability of the market players to obtain a reasonable 
ROI from cost-reflective tariffs. This inability has lead to various players attempting 
to take market share away from other players, by what may be termed “regulatory 
gaming”, as opposed to the commonly stated fears of excessive market arbitration. As 
designer markets are not constrained by physical relities, ideological change in 
policy can unpredictably impact commercial outcomes for participants 1. These risks 
and the present uncertainty in climate change mitigat on policy introduce additional 
risks to investors and market participants.  
 
While full tariff cost-reflectivity is preferable and the WA State Government has 
recently stated they are increasing tariffs more in-line with cost-reflectivity, 
determining what is cost-reflective is another issue. Recent experience has shown that 
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network costs are being determined by theoretical studies with little transparent 
analysis of actual costs or international experience. A collation and publication of 
currently available network, systems, intermittency, and high-demand performance of 
the SWIS data and costs are low cost measures that will enable limited government 
resources to more efficiently benefit to system operators, investors, policymakers, and 
the public 31. This will enable policymakers and market entities to more accurately 
develop efficiencies that lower costs of electricity service provision, increase quality 
and quality of service provision, while providing hig er resolution information to 
anticipate the potential winners and losers in the competitive market. 
 
There is clearly insufficient global experience to assess the long-term benefits from 
liberalising or privatising the electricity sector, especially in terms of least distorting 
capital investment incentives and generation adequacy for particular electricity system 
characteristics 3. However, if voters and policymakers  wish to reverse the decision to 
deregulate energy markets, then the re-integration pr cess of utility assets will not be 
simple 2. Therefore, each market development requires sufficient supporting 
information and cross-communication between various rule and market participants 
and regulators to provide as close to equilibrium as possible between market 
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